INTRODUCTION
In this essay, we aim to put forward and discuss two broad arguments. First, the questions of "new Muslim pluralism"-to be described shortly -in EU countries and Turkey are analytically and politically interrelated in important ways, and, viewing them as such may help to better address these questions. Second, in both cases, the better way to address this new pluralism seems to be social and political inclusion rooted in the merits of secular and pluralistic democracies with well-developed checks and balances. It is not social and political exclusion rooted in the twin preconceptions that Islam is essentially different from other religions and Islamism is a monolithic and unchanging ideology. Thus, both political institutions and social and political perceptions seem to matter greatly in addressing these questions democratically.
In many European countries and Turkey, a major current challenge is how to address the "new Muslim pluralism," which consists of mostly Muslim immigrant communities in the former, and new or newly vitalized expressions of Islam in the latter, within the contours of democracy. 2 European states developed and consolidated various models of secular democracies through painful historical processes that involved conflict and confrontation, negotiation and cooperation mainly among Christian and secular actors and institutions (Buttigieg and Kselman, eds, 2003; Warner 2000; Kalyvas 1996) . They are now faced with the challenge of integrating new Muslim minorities and a new religious tradition, Islam, into their social and political systems. Both the difficulties of Muslim immigrant groups in adapting to European norms and institutions, and the xenophobic and authoritarian reactions within the state institutions and majority societies challenge the quality and stability of European democracies.
Modeled on European examples, the main institutions of Turkish democracy were built during the first half of the last century through authoritarian reforms that were aimed at rapid and secular modernization, and nation-building, led by a watchful, vanguard state. (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 1996; Ahmad 1993) . These institutions were partially remolded and opened to the participation of autonomous religious actors after the transition to multiparty democracy in 1950.
Nevertheless, tensions between secular and religious actors have been an underlying theme of Simultaneously, democracies have to make adjustments both to facilitate Islamists' own transformation and to allow new religious actors to equally enjoy the democratic principles of representation and freedom. Arguably, secular and democratic governments face a choice between two broad strategies vis-à-vis Islamic movements and communities: inclusion and encouragement versus exclusion and punishment. In practice, all democracies employ a combination of both strategies, but they may emphasize one or the other. The more people view Islamism as monolithic and fixed, the more they may be inclined to promote the strategy of exclusion and punishment. The more they view it as diverse and adaptable, the more they may be inclined to support inclusion and encouragement.
Against this background, the cases of the Turkish-Islamist Milli Görüş (National Outlook, henceforth MG) in Germany and Holland, and Turkey's AKP, which partly emerged from within Turkey's MG, are illuminating. All three cases point to the important and ongoing tensions between Islamist actors on one hand and democracy and secularism on the other hand.
These tensions point to the importance of well-developed, flexible, and creative democratic institutions, for the maintenance of secular democracy in the face of these tensions. Nevertheless, as we will discuss below, on balance the comparison of the MG under the three different socialpolitical and institutional environments suggests that Islamist actors have considerable capacity to adapt to the requirements of democracy, and, the strategy of inclusion and encouragement is overall a better strategy than the strategy of exclusion and punishment. 
ISLAM, EUROPEANIZATION AND SECULAR DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY
Turkish secularism is a product of a modernization project that was simultaneously a continuation and a critique of Ottoman modernization (Tunaya 2007; Mardin 2005, 145-165; Bozdoğan and Kasaba, Eds. 1996; Ahmad 1993; Berkes 1998; Shaw 1977 all the mosques in the country. Other reforms such as the legal quality of men and women followed. In the eyes of the reformers, the main motivation of these reforms was to catch up with European states through secular modernization on social-cultural and legal, as well as political and economic, spheres.
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These authoritarian reforms were implemented relatively peacefully thanks to Kemal
Atatürk's charismatic leadership and the strong legitimacy the republican regime enjoyed after its leadership in the War of Liberation (1919 Liberation ( -1922 . But the liberal wing of the Kemalists, the Islamists, and the traditional-religious elites never consented fully to these reforms ( Furthermore, the system allowed considerable participation for Islamist political parties, through what may be called "conditional and promising participation." Participation was conditional because they faced sanctions (by the judiciary and military) whenever they crossed secularist redlines. It was promising because they were able to participate in democratic politics, freely contest elections, and come to power in local or national governments. Hence, although
Islamist parties were periodically shut down by the courts or military interventions, the five Islamist parties founded after 1971 participated in democratic politics for an average of about 6.5 years before closure. Two of them ruled the country in coalition governments, and they gained significant experience in local governments especially during the 1990s. Thus, Islamist parties had significant incentives to adapt to secular democracy so that they could rally in freely contested elections, come to power, and distribute social and economic benefits to their constituencies while in government. These incentives contrast with those in other Muslim countries such as Egypt and Algeria where Islamists are disallowed either to freely contest elections or to govern if they win elections.
As a result of these incentives, Turkish Islamic social and political actors have been diversifying and adapting to liberal economics and democracy for a long time (Yavuz 2003; Öniş 1997) . Their last and most impressive product has been the AKP, which was founded in 2001 by reformist Islamists who broke away from the Islamist Virtue Party. The AKP calls itself "conservative democratic" and has a drastically more liberal-democratic and pro-west discourse and practice than its predecessors. Until 2007, except for a few examples such as an unsuccessful attempt in 2004 to criminalize adultery, the party shunned any conspicuously religious policy in government. 7 It has also secured major legal-political reforms that made Turkey a more pluralistic and democratic country according to most accounts (Dağı 2006) . However, the AKP government also led to significant polarization between secular and religious actors. This polarization resulted from both the indirect effects of the AKP's image as an Islamic Party, and the party's actual and perceived policies that increased the visibility of Islamic actors and expressions in areas such as education and public recruitment and procurement (Toprak et al 2008; Somer 2007; Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2006) . In 2007, the party's successful election of one of its leading figures to the presidency led to major political fissures including an online ultimatum by the military and a legal case by the chief public prosecutor to shut down the party. The
Constitutional Court declined to shut down the party in 2008, although it issued a warning that the party was involved in anti-secular activities. At the same time, the government displayed increasingly "illiberal" tendencies after its landslide electoral victory in the summer of 2007. 8 Soon after the elections, the AKP made a much needed attempt to reform the Constitution, which failed mainly because it only included legislation to lift the restrictions on Islamic headscarves.
In 2007 and 2008, the government was also criticized for losing steam in passing EU-led legalpolitical reforms.
However, the flaws of the political party system and the weaknesses of the pro-secular parties may have as much to blame for the AKP's liberal-democratic deficits as the party's Islamist roots. Under a more effective political party system where secular and religious parties effectively check and balance each other on a platform of EU-led reforms, the AKP may further adopt liberal democracy in order to maintain its constituency. Absent "effective and constructive" opposition, the AKP's hegemonic tendencies gain strength (Öniş 2009; Somer 2007) . Simultaneously, Islam's being the majority religion in Turkey implies that effective constitutional provisions are needed in order to protect secular and non-Muslim freedoms from social and political pressures. The Dutch "pillarization system" gives religious groups the rights to be subsidized by the government and to establish their own infrastructure on the basis of their ideologies. The Dutch constitution guarantees freedom of religion and education as well as the subsidizing of private schools founded on religious bases (Shadid 1991) .
MILLI GÖRÜŞ IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS
In its Note of Minorities of 1983, the Dutch Government devotes serious effort to create a society in which the members of the minority and religious groups living in Holland will have equal opportunities and full chances of developing. Its policies aim to create the conditions required for emancipation and participation in society and prevent the discrimination of these groups. The Government acknowledges that it is important to take into consideration the cultural, including the religious, background of minority groups in order to construct a "multicultural society." Its policy implies an equal respect for the religious beliefs of various groups, including the Muslims. The Dutch Government stresses that "Religion fulfills a function in developing and enforcing the self-respect and hence the emancipation of many members of ethnic groups" (Shadid 1991, 90 The survey results reveal the anti-democratic stance of the MG in Germany. 49 percent of the German MG members surveyed disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that democracies may have problems but it is better than any other form of government. 45 percent of them said that having a democratic political system was a fairly or very bad way of governing, 75 percent mentioned that democracies were not good at maintaining order.
The Dutch case that allows Islamic actors to play a more legitimate role in the making of society and politics with an Islamist identity seems to initiate a process of learning and tie them to the democratic structure both institutionally and perceptually. In turn, Germany's relative exclusion of Islam from the public space seems to lead to the MG's formulating an alternative public space whereby Islamism becomes a tool to resist the "injustices" of the democratic system and challenge the norms and values of Western society.
IMMIGRATION, TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION, AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION AND SECULARISM
On its surface, Turkey's "demographic window" until 2025 should be an asset for its EU membership prospects, as long as Turkey keeps turning its young population into skilled labor through adequate educational polices. 14 The secularization of the European states can be seen as a response to the confessional wars of early modernity in Europe. In order to achieve peace and order, the state had to assume a neutral, as well as an often dominant, stand (Habermas, 2008) . Thus, secularism-the separation of church and religion-began to be conceptualized not only as a requirement of modernization and the accompanying rationalization but also as a requirement for the security of the state and society.
The European integration process has sped up the process of secularization among Western European societies. Many studies have found that an increasing majority of the European population has ceased to participate in traditional religious practices, indicating an increasing individualization of religion (Martin 1978; Davie 2000; Greeley 2003; Casanova 2004; Inglehart and Norris 2005) . This trend coincides with the strong, pro-secular current prevalent among European elites and occurs at a time when the EU is dealing with determining its external boundaries, defining its internal cultural identity, and integrating the Muslim immigrants (Casanova, 2004) . It is also occurring at a time period when the Turkish society is becoming more religious, at least in terms of self-definitions (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2006; Toprak et al. 2008 ). This should not pose a barrier to Turkish membership, however, insofar as Turkey remains a Muslim yet secular democracy, and the EU is a club of shared values such as secularism and democracy, rather than a club of cultural-religious identity.
The question is more complicated, however. Increasing claims of immigrant religious groups in European public space feed anxieties that lead many Europeans to call for the privatization of religion as a main tenet of a modern secular society's self definition, exactly when Turkey's AKP calls for a moderation of Turkish secularism to allow more public visibility for religion. Recognizing a legitimate public role for collective religious mobilization has become a problematical issue for the EU. Muslim organizations' claiming a place in European public space poses a threat to European identity not only because of their "otherness as a nonEuropean religion but because of their religiousness itself as the other of European secularity" (Casanova, 2004) . Essentializing Europe, Islam and secularism leads to overlooking the diversity within each cultural/political formation and the assumption of an inherent incompatibility between them. 18 In fact, they are all sites of confrontation as well as sites of negotiation and cooperation.
A system that is able to open up "a democratic space, shared both by religious and secular, the first giving up the absolutism of the religious truth-regime and the latter giving up its claims to hegemony over the society" has the potential to produce an Islam that embraces democratic norms (Göle 2005, 3) . This does not mean that either religion or secularism is infinitely flexible, but that they can change and develop new self-definitions in response to dialogue and social, political, and economic incentives that encourage coexistence within pluralistic democracy.
Two conceptualizations encumber the successful integration of new religious pluralism into secular democracies. The first is absolutist and moralist versions of religious ideologies that place an exclusive claim to truth and reject the voluntarism principle in religious belonging (Berger 2007) . The second is an understanding of secularism that is exclusively shaped by a positivist vision of society, and by the perception that autonomous religious actors-such as the unregulated church and new religions such as Islam in Western Europe, and the Sufi religious orders and educated yet openly religious women in Turkey-always pose a threat to this vision.
In turn, a society based on "twin tolerations" -"that is, the minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions"-may have much more capacity to produce a peaceful reconciliation among Islamism, secularism and democracy (Stepan 2000, 37) . It should be noted, however, that the emergence of twin tolerations is subject to the resolution of problems of trust between religious and secular actors, which in turn require credible commitments and effective checks and balances in the political system (Somer, 2007) . The frictions between secular and "un-secular politics" politics on one hand and between different visions of secularism on the other hand will continue to shape European and Turkish politics for a long time to come. The cases we discussed here are far from being sufficient to enable us to predict whether these frictions will increase or decrease in the future, and whether they will strengthen or weaken secular, pluralistic democracy in Europe and Turkey. This is not an easy process. Cultural difference breeds threat perceptions and defensive reactions on both religious and secular sides.
But our discussion and cases suggest that Islam is flexible like other monotheistic religions in its ability to adapt. The Islamist rooted AKP's coming to power by democratic means in Turkey, and the democratic reforms it has undertaken so far, are an outcome of the processes of interaction made possible by democratic openings as well as by bitter lessons learned from a lack of full democracy and the rule of law. Similarly, the Dutch MG's relatively democratic outlook by comparison to the German MG's radical and anti-democratic outlook illustrates the partially dynamic nature of religious identity, and the ability of Islamist movements to learn, adopt and transform.
The case studies here support the perspective that every religion is "multivocal,"
containing both democratic and non-democratic elements (Stepan 2000) . Our exaggerated perceptions of difference stem from a "culturalist" understanding of Muslim, Turkish, and European values and identities as fixed and all-powerful. Such an understanding is counterproductive from the point of view of European ideals of democracy and coexistence within diversity. At the end, the tools of democratic competition, inclusion, deliberation, and persuasion within the rule of law, which are inherent in European ideals of democracy, offer the best tools to integrate Muslims into European democracies. They also offer the best tools available to resolve the secular-religious divide challenging Turkey's democratic consolidation.
Inclusion-encouragement is overall a better strategy than exclusion-punishment. Our cases inform this key insight. 
